This paper applies Dixit-Grossman-Helpman's (1994 common agency model to investigate the formation of export subsidy and import tariff in the presence of interest groups and imperfect competition. The results of this paper indicate that even with political pressure, the Dixit-Grossman-Helpman politically determined export subsidy is identical to the Brander-Spencer rent-shifting export subsidy. The politically determined import tariff will be higher than the efficient level. This paper highlights the possibility that the presence of lobbying may restore the level of trade intervention to a more efficient one in the absence of the benevolent dictator. Joint lobbying is also considered and the results indicate that joint lobbying on export subsidy improves domestic welfare due to the elimination of the resource wasted in lobbying.
Introduction
This paper discusses the formation of trade policies in the presence of lobbying and imperfect competition. The production structure is as that described in the Brander and Spencer model, and the lobbying structure is similar to that in Grossman and Helpman (1994) except that we assume lobbying on export subsidy and import tariff are independent.
1 This is the first paper that explicitly combines the Grossman-Helpman political economy framework with the Brander-Spencer rent-shifting model. As such, the paper can be called "rent-shifting trade policies for sale".
Grossman and Helpman's (1994) study has attracted a lot of attention in recent years. The great advantage of their framework is that the results of the model can be derived from the first principle of welfare maximizing functions of both the government and the interest groups.
A similar framework is also used to investigate the joint determination of product and labor market instruments by Rama and Tabellini (1998) . 2 Magee (1998) examines the equilibrium level of tariff and welfare in the presence of trade adjustment assistance (TAA). Up to now, all these previous studies under the menu-auction framework in the literature assume perfect competition.
However, it is well-known that in the presence of imperfect competition, trade intervention by the domestic country will increase the domestic welfare by shifting some profit of foreign firms to domestic firms. Intervention of trade expands the domestic firm's market shares and profit, and besides, tariff also transfers some foreign rents to the domestic country in the form of tariff revenue. 3 Imperfect competition thus provides a clear motivation for political interest groups to engage in lobbying.
This paper starts by identifying the gainers and losers from lobbying at the levels of export subsidy and import tariff set by the domestic benevolent dictator. After identifying the gainers and losers from lobbying, the efficient trade polices and the politically determined trade polices are derived. Our central results are as follows: the Dixit-Grossman-Helpman politically determined export subsidy is identical to the Brander-Spencer strategic export subsidy; whereas the politically determined tariff is higher than the rent-shifting tariff.
The case that two interest groups are not equally effective in influencing government policies and the case that two interest groups cooperate in lobbying are also considered in this paper. Moreover, the possibility that lobbying can restore the protection level to a more efficient one is highlighted in this paper.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the basic model. In section 3, the equilibrium policies in the absence of lobbying are described and the gainers and losers resulted from the presence of lobbying are also identified in this section. The formal lobbying structure, political policies and welfare effects in the presence of lobbying are characterized in section 4. Section 5 discusses the equilibrium contributions provided by the interest groups. Section 6 discusses the possibility that lobbying may improve the social welfare in the case of no benevolent dictator. Section 7 evaluates the equilibrium policies and contribution for joint lobbying. Section 8 relaxes the assumption of no domestic consumption in the exportable good. Concluding remarks are provided in the last section.
Formal Framework
Consider a small open economy consisting of three sectors: agriculture, export and import competing industries. The agriculture good serves as numeraire, produced with labor only. The technology for the agriculture good is constant return to scale. The export competing and import competing goods are produced with labor and a specific factor. Labor is supplied inelastically to the domestic economy. As long as the agriculture sector is active, the constant marginal product of labor fixes the economy-wide wage to unity.
There are one firm producing export competing good x and one firm producing import competing good y in the domestic country. Total population is normalized to one. A fraction α x of the population owns the specific capital used in the production of good x and has a direct stake in the export competing firm, a fraction α m of the population owns the specific capital used in the production of good y and has a direct stake in the import competing firm, and for those who own either of the specific capital, they do not need to work as wage earners to make a living. Each individual is allowed to own at most one specific-factor. Those individuals who own the same specific capital have the same interest in trade protection (and promotion) organize as interest groups for political activity. The remaining 1−α x −α m (hereafter, α L ) individuals work in either firm x , firm y, or agriculture as labor input, and earn a fixed wage which is normalized to one. Labor is assumed to be inactive politically.
Production Structure
The export competing and import competing firms' behavior is modeled as a simple Nash quantity duopoly (the same as that in Brander and Spencer (1984, 1985) ). This part of the model is familiar to the strategic trade policy literature, but it is useful for our expositions later in the paper. The export competing firm produces good x, and competes with the foreign firm who produces homogeneous product x * for the foreign market. The domestic government offers the specific subsidy s to the exporting industry. The domestic firm maximizes profit π x , and the foreign firm maximizes profit π x * :
where c x and c x * are costs of domestic firm and foreign firm producing x and x * , respectively. p x (x+x * ) is the inverse demand of the two homogeneous goods x and x * in the foreign market and s is a per unit export subsidy which is treated as given.
After some algebra, we show that a higher level of domestic export subsidy lowers the product price, increases domestic profit and decreases foreign profit. In other words, a higher level of export subsidy increases domestic welfare at the cost of foreign country. The actual equilibrium level of subsidy 4 Brander and Spencer (1984a) also consider the ad valorem tariff or subsidy, and show that the critical conditions hold in both ad valorem and specific cases for Cournot oligopoly. Eaton and Grossman (1986) consider the ad valorem case, but the structure of their results is not affected if we use the specific subsidy (see Braner and Spencer,1995) . 5 The homogeneous goods x and x * are only sold in the foreign market.
will be discussed in section 3 and section 4.
The import competing firm produces good y and competes with the foreign firm which produces homogeneous product y * for the domestic market. The domestic firm maximizes profit π y , and the foreign firm maximizes profit π y * :
where c y and c y * are cost of domestic firm and foreign firm producing y and y * , respectively. p y (y +y * ) is the inverse demand of the two homogeneous goods y and y * in the domestic market and t is a per unit import tariff. Similarly, we can show that higher domestic import tariff increases the profit of the domestic firm and reduces the profit of the foreign firm. The equilibrium import tariff can be either positive or negative and will be discussed in the following sections.
Utility Function
All individuals in the domestic country have the same preferences, and maximize the utility function given by:
6 The homogeneous goods y and y * are only sold in the domestic market.
where a i is the consumption of agriculture good, and
is the total consumption of the homogeneous import competing good y and y * by individual i, i = x, m, and L which represent the shareholders of the export competing firm, the import competing firm, and labor, respectively. The function U (.) is differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave in all arguments. Utility is maximized subject to the budget constraint:
where I i is the net income of individual i and p y is the domestic (relative) price of good y, in terms of the price of the numeraire good which is normalized to one.
The consumption of good y does not depend on income.
From Eq.(3) and Eq.(4), the indirect utility function of each individual in group i has the form as:
where i = x, m, and L; CS = consumer surplus derived from good Y The gross indirect utility function for each individual in each group are given by:
where π x and π y are described in Eq.(1) and Eq. (2); (ty * − sx) is the net revenue from the export subsidy and import tariff, and it is redistributed to the members of interest groups; and L is the total wage income.
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Taking the export subsidy and import tariff set by the government as given, the indirect utility function identify the utility level of an individual in group i could be attained, if lobbying is not allowed.
Equilibrium Policies in the Absence of Lobbying
The equilibrium policies based on the social planer's objective function are solved in this section. Given the equilibrium policies, the gainers and losers from higher level of trade intervention can be identified. Identification of gainers and losers determines the positions that individuals will take regarding the implementation of the trade policies.
Equilibrium Policies without Lobbying
In the absence of lobbying, the domestic government sets the levels of interventions by maximizing the aggregate social welfare. The government's objective function is given by:
where W is the social welfare level which can be attained in the absence of any political contributions to the government.
After solving the first-order conditions, we get the optimal protection levels for the domestic economy: 7 We assume that the export subsidy is financed by lump-sum tax that falls only on the members of interest groups and analogously that the import tariff is transfered in the lump-sum fashion to the members of interest groups. This assumption ensures that the level of subsidy and tariff enter the welfare function of the un-represented group only through the consumer surplus. In other words, the level of export subsidy will not affect the welfare of un-represented group, whereas the level of import tariff will affect the welfare of un-represented group as well as the represented groups.
where the superscript w denotes the protection level which maximizes the domestic welfare.
The optimal intervention levels for the domestic economy are identical to Brander and Spencer's optimal strategic trade policies. Eq. (6) shows that the optimal export subsidy rate is positive in equilibrium, whereas Eq. (7) shows that the optimal import tariff can be positive, zero or negative depending on the relative convexity of demand. 8 We ignore the detailed discussion here since it's not the focus of this paper.
Welfare Effects
Evaluating the effects of a higher level of domestic export subsidy and import tariff on the individuals in interest groups at the optimal intervention levels, we have:
where
Eq. (8) to Eq. (11) imply that at the optimal levels of export subsidy and import tariff, an increase in the export subsidy increases the shareholders of domestic export competing firm's welfare, but decreases the shareholders of import competing firm's welfare; an increase in the import tariff increases the shareholders of domestic import competing firm's welfare, but may increase or decrease the shareholders of export competing firm's welfare depending on the size of the extra tariff revenue and the loss of consumer surplus. Eq. (8) to Eq.(11) also help us identify the gainers and losers from higher levels of subsidy and tariff. The shareholders of export competing firm are the gainers and the shareholders of import competing firm are the losers from more export promotion, and that shareholders of import competing firm are the gainers from more import protection. This identification reveals the incentives for the shareholders of manufacture firms to organize as interest groups and to participate in lobbying.
Equilibrium Policies in the Presence of Lobbying
This section analyzes the case that both the shareholders of export competing and import competing firms organize as interest groups and try to influence the policy outcomes by lobbying. Labors are assumed not organized, therefore, they are not represented by any interest group. 
The Structure of Lobbying
The lobbying structure follows Grossman and Helpman's (1994) framework which applies Bernheim and Whinston's (1986) study on menu auction. The two interest groups, as the bidders, offer various contribution schedules corresponding to different set of policies to the incumbent government at the first stage. The government, as the auctioneer, sets the policy by evaluating the weighted sum of contributions and aggregated social welfare. An equilibrium is a set of contribution schedules, and a set of trade policies. Different from Grossman and Helpman's framework, the two contribution schedules are chosen separately for the export subsidy and import tariff which in turn imply lobbying over the two policies are independent. This assumption helps us analyze the effects of lobbying on the policy (subsidy) which will not affect the welfare of the un-represented group and the policy (tariff) which will affect the welfare of the represented groups as well as the welfare of the un-represented group.
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The equilibrium contribution schedules imply that the interest groups make contributions up to the point where the marginal benefit from the resulting change in the protection levels exactly equals the marginal contribution costs.
11 In equilibrium, the contribution schedules of each interest group are given by:
where i = x, m; λ i (s) and γ i (t) are the contribution schedules provided by interest group i, and they are differentiable at s and t respectively.
Welfare Effects
The government's objective is to maximize the possibility of being reelected. With lobbying, other than providing high standard of living to the general public, the government has another resource to enhance its possibility of being reelected, i.e., the contributions provided by the interest groups. With lobbying, the government's objective function not only contains the aggregate social welfare but also the total level of political contributions. The objective function can be written as:
10 Rodrik (1986) treats tariff as a public good which benefits all firms in the industry regardless whether tariff is resulted from the efforts of an individual firm or the whole industry, which in turn, tariff seeking behavior will normally be under-provided from the perspective of the whole industry. While there is no public good element in subsidy seeking behavior. Each firm can lobby for and obtain firm-specific subsidies.
11 Following the proposition 1 of Grossman and Helpman (1994) and the lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), we only consider the case that the contribution schedules are differentiable, and around the equilibirium point. The equilibiurm set being sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium implies that all the contribution schedules are locally truthful around the equilibrium policies where the marginal change of the contributions matches the marginal change of the interest groups' gross welfare.
where β > 1 represents the weight that the government puts on the contributions from the interest groups.
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The first-order conditions of government's optimization problem are:
Substitute Eq. (12) into above, the solutions can be rewritten as:
Eq. (14) and Eq. (15) imply that the more the government values the campaign contributions provided by the interest groups, the greater the weight of interest groups' welfare is in the government's objective function.
Equilibrium Policies with Lobbying
The equilibrium protection levels in the presence of lobbying can be solved as:
where the superscript p denotes the protection level which is determined by the political process.
Compare Eq. (16) and Eq. (17) with Eq. (6) and Eq. (7), we have:
The equilibrium export subsidy in the presence of lobbying is the same as that set by the benevolent dictator. This surprising result is due to the fact that export subsidy does not cause any loss of consumer surplus in the domestic country.
Under Brander and Spencer's framework, the government's objective function is the national welfare, which is just pure economic profits. With Grossman and Helpman's politically determined subsidy, the objective function of the policy maker is a weighted sum of campaign contributions and national welfare. By applying the property of truthful contribution schedules, the equilibrium condition turns out to just depend on pure economic profits. Therefore, the level of export subsidy is the same in both cases. On the other hand, the politically determined import tariff rate is higher than the optimal level since the loss of consumer surplus is undervalued.
Proposition 1 :With lobbying, the politically determined export subsidy is exactly the same as the optimal subsidy; the politically determined tariff is higher than the optimal level.
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One may question that since the politically determined export subsidy is exactly the same as the one set by the benevolent dictator, the two interest groups will not participate in the political process of determining the subsidy level. However, without sustainable cooperation between the two groups, lobbying over both policies is the optimal strategy for both groups even they may lose the contributions. Consider the case that the export competing firm is the only one providing contribution to the government and lobby for a higher level of subsidy, the equilibrium subsidy will be higher than the optimal one, and the import competing firm will obviously be harmed by the higher subsidy. Following the same logic, the export competing firm will be hurt if the import competing firm lobbies and the export competing firm does not. Hence, even both interest groups can anticipate that lobbying leads the same outcome, they still choose to lobby. 13 In other words, the lobbying on subsidy does not cause any welfare loss if we treat contributions as the net transfer within the domestic country. x and m represent that the subsidy is joint determined by the government and one lobby x, m, respectively. According to Eq.(8) and Eq.(9), the interest group will be harmed by the lobbying of another group if he chooses not to lobby.
The Case of Two Unequally Effective Interest Groups
The case that the two interest groups are not equally effective in influencing government policies is discussed in this section. Let β x and β m represent the weight that the government evaluates export competing firm's contribution and import competing firm's contribution, respectively. The government's objective function is:
After some algebra, the distortion of lobbying on both policies can be shown as:
where s p and t p defined the equilibrium export subsidy and import tariff when the two interest groups are not equally effective and are solved from the first-order conditions of Eq. (18) .
Eq. (19) and Eq. (20) show the politically determined subsidy is higher than the optimal level if the government puts more weight on the contribution provided by the export competing firm, and vise versa. However, the tariff case is slightly different. The politically determined tariff is larger than the optimal level if the government puts more weight on the contribution provided by the import competing firm. However, if the government put more weight on the contribution provided by the export competing firm, the politically determined tariff level can be higher or lower than the benevolent dictator equilibrium level.
Equilibrium Contributions
Truthful Contribution Schedules
The equilibrium contributions are characterized in this section. In fact, the set of contribution schedules supporting the equilibrium policies is not unique. Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) , only the truthful contribution schedules are considered. 15 Truthful contribution schedules are differentiable and take the forms:
where i = x, m and z is and z it are scalars and represent reservation value
The truthful Nash equilibria arise when interest groups announce their truthful contribution schedules. From the definition of a truthful contribution schedule, the net welfare to interest group i will be the reservation value z. Hence, the interest groups will choose the reservation value scalars as large as possible. The interest groups have incentive to raise the z as long as the contributions associated with a set of feasible policies remain positive. However, interest group i must be careful not to raise z too large that the government decides to adopt the disadvantageous policies.
Indifferent Condition for the Government
The truthful contribution schedule suggests that the government must be indifferent between opting the equilibrium policy and receiving the equilibrium contributions from both interest groups, or taking a positive contribution from only one interest group, and implementing the policy which is optimal for that interest group. Following the assumption that the contribution schedules for the two policies are separate, which implies that lobbying on these two different policy instruments is indeed independent. This relationship can be written as: (24) where (s p , t p ) is the equilibrium policy characterized by Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), and (s i , t i ) is the policy determined by the joint welfare of the government and interest group i only.
Eq. (23) describes the lobbying activity on the determination of export subsidy, taking the import tariff as given (at the optimal level); Eq. (24) describes the lobbying activity on the determination of import tariff, taking the export subsidy as given (at optimal level).
After some algebra, the reservation value z and the equilibrium contributions can be written as:
The first two terms in the right-hand side of Eq. (25), [respectively, Eq. (26)] measure the maximum gross welfare attained by the government and two active interest groups, taking tariff (respectively, subsidy) as given. The last two-term in the right-hand side of Eq.(25), [respectively, Eq. (26)] measure the maximum gross welfare attained by the government and one interest group, taking tariff (respectively, subsidy) as given.
Eq. (25) and Eq. (26) are strictly positive, which imply that both interest groups are able to extract some rent from the political process. The larger is the reservation value, the larger is the net welfare to interest group i.
from both side of Eq. (25) and Eq.(26) respectively and rearrange them, we show that the con-tribution are strictly positive:
Eq. (25) 
Can Lobbying Improve the Domestic Social
Welfare?
Can lobbying improve the domestic social welfare? The answer is obviously no if the incumbent government is a benevolent dictator as described in section 3. However, if the government is not a benevolent dictator and the contributions are the only concern of the government, the welfare may be improved by the lobbying. The case that the government only cares about the campaign contributions is considered in this section. We assume that without campaign contributions, there will be free trade in the domestic market, i.e., s = 0 and t = 0. Assume both interest groups provide the contributions to influence government's policy decision, the government's objective function becomes:
After some algebra, the equilibrium policies are solved as:
where the superscript p denotes the level of protection which is determined solely by the contributions provided by the two active interest groups.
The welfare change due to the lobbying on export subsidy can be written as:
Eq. (29) represents the extra profit earned by the domestic export competing firm. With lobbying, the export subsidy is restored to the most efficient level since s p = s w and the domestic welfare is higher than that in free trade.
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The welfare change due to the lobbying on import tariff can be written as:
The first term in the right-hand-side of Eq. (30) represents the sum of the extra profit earned by the domestic import competing firm. The second term measures the tariff revenue collected from the foreign rivalry. The direction of the welfare change depends on magnitude of these two terms, and it is ambiguous. represents the resource wasted in the political process, and 0 δ 1. As δ = 0, the government effectively redistributes total contributions to the domestic residents, hence the contributions are just transfers within the domestic country. As δ = 1, the total amount of contributions represents a deadweight loss to the domestic welfare by the political process.
17 Similarly, if we take the wasted resouce into accout, there is one more term −δ[γ x (t) + γ m (t)] in the right-hand-side of Eq. (30 The conditions for sustainable cooperation are assumed to be satisfied. Based on this assumption, the case that the two active interest groups shift from non-cooperative to cooperative is discussed in this section. The two interest groups join together as a cartel.
The government's objective function is defined as:
In equilibrium, the contribution schedules offered by the cartel are given by:
where λ(s) and γ(t) are the joint contributions to the government After solving the first-order conditions, the politically determined export subsidy and import tariff are identical to those described in section 4.
Joint Contributions
Since the politically determined equilibrium policies in the non-cooperative and cooperative setting are exactly the same, the next task is to compare the amount of contributions in both cases. Given the same policies, if the total contribution is less in the cooperate case, then the cooperation of the two active interest groups is welfare improving.
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given; the right hand side of Eq.(33) measures the maximum welfare can be attained by the government alone and by the government and both interest groups. Eq.(33) is more likely to be satisfied if the interests of both groups diverge from each other. Without further information, the sign of Eq. (33) can't be determined. 8 General Results
Production Structure
We adopt the perspective of Brander and Spencer's "third-market" model in the previous sections, in which no domestic consumption of the exportable goods. This assumption is relaxed in this section.
After incorporating the domestic consumption, the firms have to make the decisions on how much to produce for their own country and how much to produce for export.
The objective functions of the firms producing the export competing goods are given by:
where π x is the profit of the domestic export competing firm. x and x e are the goods that domestic firm produces for the domestic market and foreign market respectively. Asterisk refers to foreign country variable. p x (x+x * e ) is the inverse demand of homogeneous goods x and x * e in the domestic market and p x * (x * + x e ) is the inverse demand of homogeneous goods x e and x * in the foreign market. 19 The domestic government subsidies the export by s per unit of export.
After some algebra, the effects of export subsidy on each market can be shown as: 
Utility Function
All individuals in the domestic country have the same preferences, and maximize the utility function subject to the budget constraint:
where X ci is total consumption of the export competing good x and x * e by individual i. All the definitions of other variables are the same as in section 2.2. The gross indirect utility functions for each individual in each group are given by: 
Equilibrium Policies with Lobbying
With lobbying, the government's objective function contains the contributions provided by the interest groups and the aggregate social welfare as Eq. (13): Following the same procedures, the politically determined equilibrium policies are be written as: 
Concluding Remarks
This paper incorporates imperfect competition in Grossman and Helpman's (1994) political framework to study the lobbying effects over the strategic trade policies. The levels of trade intervention without lobbying are the same as the Brander and Spencer's (1984, 1984) efficient intervention levels. When both interest groups lobby for higher protection levels, the government sets policies by maximizing the weighted sum of contributions and aggregate social welfare. In equilibrium, the politically determined subsidy is exactly the same as Brander and Spencer's optimal protection level, whereas the politically determined import tariff is higher than the optimal level since the loss of consumer surplus is undervalued. The results hold even after incorporating the domestic consumption of the exportable good in the model. This paper also indicates that lobbying on export subsidy improves the domestic welfare by restoring the export subsidy to the most efficient level in the absence of the benevolent dictator. However, lobbying on the import tariff can increase or decrease the domestic welfare.
If both active interest groups cooperate, the politically determined equilibrium policies will stay the same. However, the joint contribution for the lobbying over subsidy reduces to zero, which implies that cooperation of lobbying groups improves domestic welfare if we assume that real resources are used up in lobbying. This is due to the elimination of the resource wasted in lobbying. The direction of welfare change regarding to joint lobbying on the import tariff can be higher or lower.
